Furthermore, the European Regulator's Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) stresses that 'a lack of integration of balancing markets is a key impediment to the development of a single European electricity market ' [3] .
Viewing the above, it appears that balancing market integration is generally considered as a process with positive effects, notably those of enhanced competition and reduction of balancing costs. However, insufficient research has yet been conducted to support a conclusion of this kind, and a systematic analysis appears to be lacking completely. This paper aims to fill up the gap by means of a high-level qualitative analysis of balancing market integration. In this multi-criteria analysis, the effects of implementation of seven main market arrangements for cross-border balancing are assessed on the basis of ten high-level performance criteria.
The performance criteria and cross-border balancing arrangements will be introduced in resp. Sections III and IV.
In Section V, the results of the multi-criteria analysis are presented.
III. PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
The evaluation of the effects of balancing market integration requires a set of performance criteria. However, it is not easy to specify what defines a well-performing balancing market. To illustrate this, we will introduce here the basic market structure and concepts, as shown in Figure 1 .
Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) offer two types of balancing services to the TSO: reserve capacity and balancing energy. Balancing energy is delivered by real-time adjustment of balancing resources, whereas reserve capacity is procured by the TSO in order to obtain the option to activate balancing energy during the reservation period. Both types are offered in the form of bids, and selected in merit (price) order. Often, the price of the last selected bid becomes the price at which all bids are rewarded: the reserve capacity price, or the balancing Now the balancing energy price and imbalance price appear to be quite logical performance criteria. However, they are actually indicators that should be interpreted by relating those prices to spot market prices. On a higher level, more general balancing market performance criteria can be defmed from a system perspective, which are applied here to the qualitative analysis of cross-border balancing arrangements. They are listed in Table I .
The first two performance criteria, 'balance planning accuracy' and 'availability of balancing resources', are effectiveness criteria that concern the technical performance of balancing markets. Balance planning accuracy is the accuracy of energy programs of BRPs, which determines the size of the energy imbalance over the PTUs, and thereby influences technical performance. A lower availability of balancing resources means a larger chance that there are not enough 2 resources to restore the system balance, or that the stability of the system frequency will reduce.
The next four criteria in Table I concern This arrangement can take different forms, from bilateral trade to mutual sharing of bids.
A common merit order list is realized by the integration of the different Balancing Service Markets in the balancing region into one regional BSM, creating one regional bid ladder, or merit order list. There will be one regional System
Operator that activates balancing bids for maintaining the system balance of the entire balancing region.
The seven cross-border balancing arrangements that are incorporated in the multi-criteria analysis are 'ACE netting', 'BSP-TSO trading of balancing energy', 'BSP-TSO trading of reserve capacity', 'additional voluntary pool for balancing energy', 'additional voluntary pool for reserve capacity', 'common merit order list for balancing energy', and 'common merit order list for reserve capacity and balancing energy'. In Figure 3 , they are positioned in a possible balancing market integration process. It must be remarked that there is no fixed order of integration steps; balancing market integration is in essence a reversible institutional change process. The important distinction between the cross-border trade of reserve capacity and of balancing energy is that the first requires certainty on the availability of cross-border capacity for the entire contract period. We assume that cross-border capacity needs to be reserved for the cross-border trade of reserve capacity. In addition, we assume that cross-border capacity still remains after day-ahead and intraday auctions, meaning that balancing service exchange can be realized without cross-border capacity reservation, but to a lower extent.
V. MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS
In the multi-criteria analysis, the effects of the 
A. Effects of diff erent cross-border balancing arrangements
ACE netting: ACE netting will result in a large reduction of activated balancing energy bids in the involved control areas, and thereby improve balancing market effectiveness and competitiveness. As there is no specific cross-border trade transaction involved, and all areas benefit from this arrangement, there is no need for payment and an additional pricing mechanism, even though some areas will benefit more than others due to differently shaped bid ladder curves. A relevant detailed design choice is in what way the netted ACEs should be redistributed to the control areas. It may be best to redistribute proportional to the system imbalance of the control areas, in order to give appropriate incentives to BRPs and BSPs in the different balancing markets.
BSP-TSO trading of balancing energy: For this arrangement, an underlying design choice is whether or not
BSPs are allowed to bid into two Balancing Energy Markets (BEMs) at the same time. Allowing this means high uncertainty on the effectiveness of bid activation by TSOs. We assume that this is not allowed, but that results in a shift of bids to the more expensive BEMs, and therefore also in higher balancing energy and imbalance prices in the cheaper balancing markets. Moreover, such large price differences between control areas may also lead to opportunities for gaming: BSPs that bid into more expensive BEMs, receive a high balancing energy price upon selection, do not deliver the energy, and only need to pay the lower imbalance price of the own control area. However, the harmonization of imbalance settlement designs could mitigate this potential for gaming.
BSP-TSO trading of reserve capacity: First, a general remark can be made about the cross-border trade of reserve capacity. In the UCTE synchronous zone, a minimum amount of capacity should be reserved within the own control area, according to the UCTE guidelines, namely 66% of the secondary control reserves, and 50% of the sum of secondary and tertiary control reserves [9] . This limits the scope of cross border trade of this type of balancing service. Furthermore, a specific issue for BSP-TSO trading of reserve capacity is whether the TSO or the BSP reserves the cross-border capacity that is required for the reserve capacity exchange. In case of the latter, probably less exchange will occur. This arrangement reduces efficiency of cross-border capacity allocation, if it reduces the economic value of day-ahead trade more than the total balancing costs decrease in the balancing region. A common merit order list for balancing energy: ACE netting implicitly takes place in this arrangement, because the system balance is maintained regionally, by means of regional activation of balancing energy bids. The central activation also makes sure that the cheapest bids in the region are activated.
This will greatly reduce the balancing service costs. The larger supply of bids and the lower demand for bids (caused by the ACE netting), may lead to enhanced competition. However, this arrangement will also affect BSP bidding behaviour.
When there are large balancing energy price differences between areas, this creates more market opportunities for the BSPs in the cheaper areas. If there are ample balancing resources in the cheap areas, these BSPs could benefit from bidding somewhat below the price level of the more expensive areas, as a result of which overall price efficiency could reduce while allocative efficiency increases. Depending on the pricing mechanisms, this may also lead to higher balancing energy prices and imbalance prices for the cheap areas, compared to the situation of separate balancing markets.
A common merit order list for energy & capacity: The existence of a common merit order list for reserve capacity implies that there is also a merit order list for balancing energy. The merit order list for reserve capacity is restricted by the national reserve requirements and the need for cross border capacity, but assuming that cross-border capacity is reserved to enable meeting the national requirements in the regionally cheapest way, we can expect that the availability of balancing resources will actually increase. This is because the reserved cross-border capacity can in this arrangement also be utilized for optimized balancing energy exchange. Thus, this arrangement could largely increase allocative efficiency of Balancing Service Markets. However, the size of this increase would be limited when ample cross-border capacity remains for balancing energy exchange after cross-border intraday trade already without integration.
B. Effects on diff erent performance criteria
In Figure 4 , the relative impact of the different arrangements on availability of balancing resources, allocative efficiency, This is because BRPs generally try to schedule accurately in any case, and because the arrangements do generally not change the imbalance settlement design. The exception may be the common merit order list, where a regional design could be installed to complement the regional balance regulation.
Non-discrimination:
Generally, non-discrimination increases, although only in a common merit order list the equality of market conditions for BSPs is certain to increase, due to integration of the Balancing Service Market(s).
Operational efficiency: The height of the transaction costs are expected to decrease for the common merit order list, to increase for ACE netting and a voluntary pool, and to remain the same for BSP-TSO trading, based on the change in complexity of the totality of balancing market rules.
Transparency: The transparency is generally expected to increase, but this depends on the clarity of the detailed cross border balancing rules, and on information spreading.
Integration costs: Integration costs are only one-time costs, and are not expected to be very high, because the implementation of an arrangement is predominantly an institutional change. These costs will be lowest for ACE netting and BSP-TSO trading, higher for a pool, and highest for a merit order list.
C. General results
If we want to give a single assessment of the impact of different cross-border balancing arrangements on balancing market performance based on the analysis, we can add up the effects on the different performance criteria. In addition, the criteria should be given a certain weight. We have given a weight of 'two' to availability of balancing resources, BSM concentration, BSM price efficiency, and socio-economic welfare of cross-border capacity allocation, and a weight of 'one' to the other criteria. This has resulted in the relative effect ranges given in Figure 5 . One should keep in mind, however, that weighing is largely a subjective exercise depending on the views of the policy-makers and stakeholders.
,-- In Figure 5 , the effect ranges of the total impact of the arrangements on all the performance criteria are illustrated.
ACE netting is a no-regret option that is easily implemented and is certain to have a large positive impact. BSP-TSO trading rather has a large negative impact on balancing market performance than a positive one. For an additional voluntary pool, it is quite uncertain whether the impact will be positive or negative, and whether it will be a large or small impact. A merit order list is found to have a positive impact, but this could range from small to very large.
Because of the required reservation of cross-border capacity, the arrangements that concern the exchange of reserve capacity between control areas are more likely to have a negative impact. In addition, the size of the impact is generally smaller than for arrangements for balancing energy exchange, because the reservation enables only the exchange of specific balancing bids. The exception is a common merit order list for capacity and energy, where the reservation also enables a lot more cross-border balancing energy exchange.
The high level of uncertainty, as represented by the effect ranges, is caused by the dependency of the impact of the arrangements on both endogenous and exogenous factors.
Endogenous factors relate to the (detailed) design of the balancing markets involved; exogenous factors to power system and market conditions in the balancing region.
Important endogenous factors that the analysis revealed are the detailed configuration of the cross-border balancing arrangement, and the imbalance settlement design. Revealed exogenous factors include the size of system imbalances, level of supply of balancing resources, available cross-border capacity for balancing energy exchange without specific reservation, and the level of price differences between 6 Balancing Service Markets in different areas. All this influences the behaviour of BRPs and BSPs, which basically determines balancing market performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In general we may conclude from the qualitative analysis that ACE netting is a beneficial initial integration option, that BSP-TSO trading should not be aimed for, that the direction and size of the impact of an additional voluntary pool is quite uncertain, and that a common merit order list has a positive effect of uncertain magnitude.
The effect of the cross-border balancing arrangement on the behaviour of Balancing Service Providers is key, but this depends too much on the specific combination of detailed balancing market design choices and general power system and market conditions. Therefore, the high-level impact assessment of alternative arrangements is subject to large uncertainties.
Another identified complication is that even when the overall balancing market performance improves after integration, the performance could worsen in some of the control areas. This possibility should be taken into account.
All the existing uncertainties and dependencies makes that the value of balancing market integration can only be concluded from the consideration and analysis of specific balancing market integration cases, and it is therefore recommended to decision-makers to do so. In addition, we can recommend adopting ACE netting as a first integration step, but to await further steps until further analysis has proven their favourability for a specific group of control areas.
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